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Abstract 
Wellman, H.M., and Woolley, J.D., 1990. From simple desires to ordinary beliefs: The early 
development of everyday psychology. Cognition, 35: 245-275. 
‘We provide evidence for the claim that before young children construe human 
action in terms of beliefs and desires they understand action only in terms of 
simple desires. This type of naive psychology-a simple desire psychoiogy- 
constitutes a coherent understanding of human action, but it differs porn the 
belief-desire psychology of slightly older children and adults. In this paper we 
characterize what we mean by a simple desire psychology and report two exper- 
iments. ln Experiment 1 we demonstrate that 2-year-old3 can predict actions 
and reactions related to si,mple desires. In Experiment 2 we demonstrate that 
many 2-year-aids pass desire reasoning tasks while at the same time failing 
belief reasoning tasks that are pavsed by slightly older children, and that are 
as comparable as possible to the desire tasks they pass with easti. 
Our aim is to chart the early development of everyday psychology, that is, 
the early development of commonsense understandings of human action. 
One example of an everyday psychology is adults’ explanation of actions in 
terms of beliefs and desires. ecent research has shown that preschool chil- 
dren also understand and p ng actors’ beliefs 
and desires (e.g., Wellman mer, 1983; Yuiil, 
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ne the everyday psychology of still younger children, 
explanation and predicti n of human behavior is essen- 
e explain actions in te of the wishes, hopes, beliefs, 
and ideas of the actor and we fee at our own behavior is the product of 
such mental states and attitudes. horthand description for this causal- 
t is a belief-desire framework for construing ac- 
nald’s to buy hamburgers, for example, this is 
by appeal to something like ‘s desire for hambur- 
at he can buy hamburgers at Donald’s. These fac- 
tors-beliefs and desires-intertwine and interpcletrate. Along with con- 
structs such as feelings and emotions, perception and intention, they form a 
coherent explanatory system for human action. The scheme iiy; Figure 1 pro- 
vides an outline of these and other aspects of everyday belief-desire reason- 
ing. It is difficult to capture succinctly the nature of everyday belief-desire 
sychology; certainly the scheme in Figure 1 provides only a crude outline. 




John buy a green ca nted a new car, believed that that 
as the best one, and green looked good. 
y did Jill go ta the deli? She was hungry and wac?ed a sandwich, she 
hates white bread, and thought she’d seen a nice whole-wheat sandwich 
at the deli. 
e scheme suggests that actions are caused by and hence predictable 
s (e.g., wanted a car) and beliefs (e.g., believed that model was 
best); but that, in addition, perceptions often’ cause or inform beliefs (e.g., 
she’d seen a nice whole-wheat sandwich); that basic emotions (e.g., hate) and 
physiological states (e.g., hunger) ground one’s desires (e.g., she was hungry 
and wanted a sandwich); and that actions result in real-world outcomes which 
produce psychological reactions (e.g., getting something you want tends to 
produce happiness or satisfaction, getting something you did not expect pro- 
duces surprise). 
Note especially the importance of the construct of belief in this construal 
of our everyday psychology. Desires motivate behaviors but beliefs frame 
them. Persons’ actions can thwart their own desires (Joe wants his watch, 
which is in the basement, but he’s looking for it in the bedroom) because 
beliefs are also at work (Joe think it’s in the bedroom). There is controversy 
at present about whether 3-year-olds understand others’ beliefs; some studies 
seem to show that they do (e.g., Wellman & arts&, 1988) but several 
investigators claim that this understanding is apparent only at about 4 years 
-believe, suppose 
-love, hate, fear -want, dsrite 
4u~nger, thirst -wish, hope 
-pain, arousal -aught, should 
(e.g., Forguson & Gopnik, 1988; Pemer, 1988). Nonetheless sometime 
around 3 or 4 years children, like adults, seem to unde~tand others’ behavior 
via a cc?nception of belief embedded within a larger beliefiiesire reasoning 
scheme re~g~ably like the one depicted in Figure 1. 
In the current research our hypotheses focus on younger children still. In 
essence, we claim that 3 years is just about the earliest age at which children 
understand belief and thus can participate in beliefdesire reasoning; 2-year- 
olds fail to ~de~tand belief.’ EIowever, 2-year-olds are not simply i~or~t 
of human action; we propose that they too evidence a coherent naive under- 
standing of certain psycholo~cal causes of human action, but an understand- 
ing different from our own and one that we will term a simple desire psychol- 
ogy. To advance this hypothesis we undertake two tasks. First, we wish to 
characterize what we mean by a simple desire psychology. To do this we 
contrast it first with a drive psychology and then contrast it with a belief-de- 
‘In this paragraph, and at other places ;hroughoua the paper, we talk about 2-year-olds versus 3-year-olds. 
This is purely a ~nve~en~, To be more accurate, and as stated in several places, we believe that unde~~d- 
ing of belief first appears in many older Zyear-olds in the months right before the third birthday. Even this 
is inexact. We do not believe that the conceptual developments we are charting are tied to chronologieai age, 
in any very precise way; we simply use age as a convenient marker for talking about a sequence of early 
developments. We contend only that among samples of middle-class children of the sort studied here (and in 
related studies such as Shatx et al., 1983; Wimmer & Psmer, 1983) Ic*e in the third year is when many children 
first evidence an early understanding of belief. Of course some individuals do so earlier and some later. As a 
shorthand way of describing this development we talk of 2-year-oh& as desire psychologists versus 3-year-olds 
as belief-desire psychologists, although many children have a beginning understanding of belief somewhat 
in advance of their third birthday. To be clear, our focal claims are that (1) simple desire understanding 
precedes unde~tanding of beliefs, but that (2) unde~t~ding of belief is t~ically achieved at a very young age. 
. n we provide a description of what simple 
Second, we provide some needed evidence 
mple desire psychologists. 
., he is hungry) and simple desires (e.g., 
e of motivational forces behind a potential 
an apple both describe internal states ener- 
n outcomes, namely relieving hunger or 
drives and simple de- 
sm’s internal, ener- 
logical state (e.g., 
s describe a specific object (or event 
rsely, drives, in their core sense, are 
silent about objects; desires are silent about physiological state. For example, 
being hungry can be satisfied by an apple, a banana, or a 
object is not (essentially) described by stating the drive. 
apple” is not satisfied by a banana; the object is essential 
and desires, while similar in some respects (note their contiguous relation in 
Figure l), are diffe rent in that desires, not drives, encompass a specified 
object. 
This necessarv specification of an object makes desires, even simple de- 
sires, similar to beliefs in an important respect. Simple desires in our prop- 
osal, and beliefs more ordi re intentional constructs in the sense that 
is is an important similarity, often noted 
, 197$). Indeed, in adult understanding, 
on’s desires are often construed in terms similar to our construal of 
beliefs. Thus, both desires and beliefs are called p ositional attitudes. Be- 
liefs, for example, are beliefs about a proposition: believes that that is an 
apple. In this construal beliefs are seen as repres ional. To say that “he 
believes that that is an apple” is to assert something like that the believer has 
a cognitive representation of the world and in that representation the desig- 
nated object is an apple. In parallel, a person’s desires can be construed in 
such propositional attitude terms-a desire ab a proposition, about a pos- 
sible represented state of affairs. ple, becomes: He wants that 
there be an apple and that he o plausible because, in adult 
belief-desire psychology, desires are inextricably connected with beliefs. If 
he wants an apple, then it implies that he believes an apple exists. 
wever, intentional states need not be representational. More specifi- 
sible to imagine a very simple conception of desire, unlike 
anding of belief, in which desires are not representational. 
rstanding, to say that “he wants an apple” would embody 
no notion of representing an apple, simply wanting one. In this simple con- 
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ception, desires are not attitudes about a proposition but attitudes about 
actual objects or states of affairs. Figure 2 is an attempt to capture this simple 
conception of desire and to contrast it with a conception of belief. That figure 
y portrays, at the top, someone (the person on the right) thinking 
of another’s (the penon on the left) internal state of desire. At the bottom 
the figure portrays someone thinking of another’s internal state of belief, ‘The 
internal states of the target person (on the left) are graphically depicted in 
something like the way the first person construes them. Note that in the case 
of simple desires the conceiver need only think of the target person as having 
something like an internal longing for an external object. The relevant out- 
come concerns simply obtaining the object. In the case of belief the conceiver 
must think of the target person as representing the apple somehow, and thus 
the relevant outcome concerns truth or correspondence. This depiction is 
both too crude and too specific, but no matter how portrayed, the xey idea 
here is that a valid conception of belief evidences appreciation of the fact 
that persons not simply in a world of objects and events but also in a 
world of representations of objects and events. A simple understanding of 
desires is conceivable, however, that does not require such an appreciation. 
Figure 2. A pictorial contrast between simple desires and beliefs. 
/ 




Beiief (thinks that that is an apple) 
desire psychology-one 
directed toward obtain- 
fferent from a belief-de- 
a conception of internal 
To reiterate, we are not 
notion of desire charac- 
reasoning about ac- 
it, the actor is 
attributed simple desires, that is, internal dispositions toward (or against) 
certain actions or objects. Thus, actors are seen as wanting to get a drink of 
water, wanting to run or jump, desiring a certain toy, and so on. Such desires 
may or may not be seen by even young children as grounded in basic emotions 
and physiological states (e.g., fears, thirst). We do not know. More focally, 
however, such simple desires are seen as causing the organism to do certain 
things. Essentially (but not exhaustively), simple desires cause actors (1) to 
engage in goal-directed actions (seek water, avoid fire) including persisting 
in goal-directed actions (if the route to water is blocked, seek an alternative), 
and (2) to have certain emotional reactions (getting what you desire yields 
happiness, not getting it produces frustration, unhappiness, etc.). 
Such a desire psychology c ide some simple but cogent accounts and 
f various acts. if a desire psychologist knows that “Jill 
ct”, he can pr Jill will look for the object. And if he 
knows “Jill wants the object” and that “ object is in the kitchen”, he can 
predict that Jill will look in the kitchen. e can predict that “Jill will look in 
the kitchen” under the general maxim that people act to fulfill their desires. 
This example can be used to clarify how simple desire reasoning can proceed 
without a conception of belief. The simple desire psychologist knows the 
object is in the kitchen, and utilizes this knowledge in predicting where Jill, 
the character, will look. Critically, the desire psychologist does not attribute 
such a knowledge state to Jill. The simple desire psychologist sees Jill as 
having a desire and sees the world as having objects; the desire psychologist 
recruits his own knowledge of the world and of Jill’s desires to predict Jill’s 
desire-caused action. e does not attribute knowledge of the world (a belief- 
representational state) to Jill. Similarly a desire psychologist can also predict 
that if Jill finds the desired object she will be happy. If Jill does not find the 
object she will be unhappy to some degree. The desire psychologist can pre- 
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diet Jill’s happiness and unhappiness under the general maxim that getting 
what you want makes you happy. 
Note that simple desires are intentional states and thus simple desire 
psychology rests on an important distinction between internal intentional 
states and external reality. Specifically desires are, in part, independent of 
outcomes; one can desire t gs that may or may not be obtained. This 
independence logical state and reality is clear in several respects. It 
dnderpins, for differential prediction of continued action (because 
you did not yet get whit you want) versus cessation of action (because you 
did) and also underpins prediction of emotional reactions of happiness versus 
unhappiness. To summarize, a simple desire psychology attributes to the 
actor certain internal desires, recruits various sources of knowledge about the 
external world, and generates inferences about how actions in the world stem 
from and fulfill (or not) the actor’s desires. In these regards a simple desire 
psychology can provide the reasoner with some significant explanatory re- 
sources. 
A simple desire psychology fails in some respects, hol/gever. In particular 
there are certain phenomena that belief-desire psychology can account for 
that simple desire psychology cannot. These achievements depend on a con- 
ception of belief as a representational mental state in interaction with, but 
independent of, desire. Including a concept of belief in one’s explanatory 
apparatus can provide, for example, an explanation for why two organisms 
with the same desire (or the same organism with the same desire at different 
times) might nonetheless engage in two different acts-because they have 
different beliefs. Moreover, adding a concept of belief can provide an expla- 
nation for why an actor might do something that seems contradictory to his 
or her own desires, for example why Jill might look for a desired object at 
one location when it is really at a second location-“because she believed it 
was at the first location”. 
Our hypothesis is that most 2-year-olds have a simple desire psychology 
and engage in only desire reasoning about actions, but that by 3 years, or 
just a little before, children have and utilize a concept of belief. Given our 
prior demonstrations that 3-year-olds do understand belief (Wellman & 
Bartsch, 1988; Bartsch & Wellman, 1989), we concentrate on two demonstra- 
tions here. In Experiment 1 we demonstrate that 2-year-olds can predict 
actions and reactions related to simple desire descriptions. In Experiment 2 
we demonstrate that many 2-year-olds pass desire reasoning tasks while at 
the same time failing belief reasoning tasks that are as comparable as possible 
to the desire tasks and that are passed by slightly older children, 3-year-olds . 
psychology this represents an intrigu- 
psychology is a naive psychology of 
ant, therefore, to document 
ple desire reasoning. As out- 
should, at a minimum, be able to 
on as to an actor’s simple desires, 
ar to predict (a) the cessation of relev actions for an actor who 
or her desires, and (b) the persistence action for an actor whose 
desires are as yet unattained. In addition, a desire psychologis be able 
to (2) predict appropriate emotional reactions, essentially to (a) that 
esire yields happiness, pleasure, or satisfaction, and (b) 
elds unhappiness or sadness. In Experiment 1 we examine 
whether 2-year-olds can engage in these four s rts of desire reasoning. 
Sixteen older 2-year-olds (range 2-7 to 3-1, M = 2-10) participated. There 
were 8 boys and 8 girls, all from a preschool program serving an ethnically 
l d but predominant y white middle-class clientele in a small midwestern 
Tasks 
Children made judgments about the actions and emotional reactions of 
small cardboard characters in each of three types of situations. In the Finds- 
anted situation the character wants something that may be in one of two 
_ocations, the character searches in location 1 and gets the object. The Finds- 
Nothing situation was identical to Finds-Wanted except that upon searching 
in location 1 nothing was there. The Finds-Substitute situation was identical 
anted except that upon searching in location 1 the character found 
e object but not the one said to be wanted. t was important to 
include this Finds-Substitute situation in our procedures in order to assess 
whether children understand the object specificity of desires. 
In making action judgments children had to predict the character’s sub- 
sequent action, that is, whether he or she would go on to search in location 
2 or would stop searching. An understanding of the implications of characters’ 
desires should lead to a prediction of continued search in the Finds-Nothing 
and Finds-Substitute situations but not in the case of Finds-Wanted. 
Early development of everyday psychology 253 
In making emotion ju ents children had to state the character’s emo- 
tional reaction, whether or she was happy or sad. An understanding of 
the role of desires in mediating emotional reactions sh 
ss in the Finds-Wante 
uld yield a p&i&on 
situation but sadness in the Finds-Nothing 
Finds-Substitute situations. 
Procedures 
Two parallel sets of six stories each, Action stories and Emotion stories, 
were presented to each child. All stories were about a character who wanted 
to find something. Each story was told with a cardboard cut-out of the charac- 
ter, shown from the back (so as to depict no facial expression), and a 
cardbbard layout depicting two locations. Children were told, for example, 
that Sam wants to find his rabbit, told that the rabbit might be hiding in either 
of the two depicted locations, then shown Sam walking to one of the loca- 
tions, opening it, and either finding the desired object (a cut-out of the rabbit) 
or something else (a dog) or nothing. In Action stories, stories where the 
child had to judge the character’s search actions, children were also told that 
the character wanted the object for a specific purpose, for example, to take 
it to school. Thus, in these stories a third location, a final destination (e.g., 
the school), was depicted also. After the character had looked in the first 
location children made their predictions. To elicit action judgments children 
were asked what the character would do next. For example, “What will Sam 
do next, will he look in the (other hiding location) or will he go to school?” 
Children could respond by naming or pointing to their choice. 
Emotion stories, stories where children had to judge the character’s emo- 
tional reaction, were identical to Action stories except that no final destina- 
tion was mentioned. Children were simply told, for example, of Sam who 
wanted a rabbit, shown Sam looking in one of the two hiding locations, and 
shown him either finding the rabbit there or not. Then, to elicit emotion 
judgments the children were asked how Sam felt: “Does he feel happy or 
does he feel sad?” Children couid respond by saying happi or sad or by 
pointing to a drawing of a happy or sad face. The six story scripts are pre- 
sented in Table 1. 
Each child was tested in two sessions, one session for Action stories and 
another for Emotion stories. In each session he or she received two stories 
each of the Finds-Wanted, Finds-Nothing, and Finds-Substitute varieties. 
Within a session the stories and characters varied (e.g., Sam wants to find 
his rabbit, Annie wants to find her crayons) with one exception. In two pairs 
of stories two characters were presented as getting the exact same object but 
it was either wanted or not. For example, Sam wants a rabbit and gets a dog 
(Finds-Substitute story) and Johnny wants a dog and gets a dog (Finds- 
ble 1. 
&&s Johnny. He wants to find his dog [to take his dog to the park, ‘cause that’s what he 
really wants to d01.~ His dog might be in the house, or it might be in the garage. So, he’s looking 
for his dog [to take it to the park]. Watt he’s looking for his dog in the garage. Look. He 
finds his dog. 
Here’s Linda. She wants to find her mittens [so she can go outside and play with her snowman, 
‘cause that’s what she really wants to do]. Her mittens might be in the closet, or they might be 
in her backpack. So, she’s going to look for her mittens [so she can go outside]. Watch, she’s 
looking for her mittens in her backpack. Look. She finds her mittens. 
Finds-Nothing Stories 
Here’s Betsy. She wants to find her horse [to take her horse to the pond, ‘cause that’s what 
she really wants to do]. Her horse might be in the red barn, or it might be in the green barn. 
So, she’s going to look for her horse [to take it to the pond]. Watch, she’s looking for her horse 
in the green barn. Look. She doesn’t find her horse. 
Here’s Peter. He wants to find his bike [to ride his bike on the sidewalk, ‘cause that’s what he 
really wants to do]. His bike might be in the garage or it might be in the playroom. So, he’s 
going to look for his bike [to ride it on the sidewalk]. Watch, he’s looking for his bike in the 
playroom. Look. He doesn’t find his bike. 
Finds-Substitute Stories 
k?ere’s Annie. She wants to find her crayons [to take her crayons to her friend’s house, ‘cause 
that’s what she really wants to do]. Her crayons might be in the desk, or they might be in the 
toybox. So, she’s going to look for her crayons [to take them to her friend’s house]. Watch, 
she’s looking for her crayons in the toybox. Look. She finds some mittens. 
Here’s Sam. He wants to find his rabbit [to take his rabbit to school to show to his friends, 
‘cause that’s what he really wants to do]. His rabbit might be in the shed, or it might be in the 
garden. So, he’s looking for his rabbit [to take it to school]. Watch, he’s looking for his rabbit 
in the garden. Look. He finds a dog. 
“The main text presents information included in Emotion stories. Text in brackets indicates 
information that was included in the Action stories but omitted from the Emotion stories, 
anted). This arrangement allowed us to compare children’s ratings of 
characters experiencing the exact same outcome but having had different 
desires. This provides a sensitive test of whether individual children under- 
stand the independence of desire and outcome. 
In each session the stories were presented in two different orders counter- 
balanced across the 16 children. These two orders varied whether a Finds- 
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anted story or a Fin s-Substitute story was presented first; Find 
stories always separated the other two stories. When soliciting ac 
ments, whether the second location or the final destination was 
rst was counterbalanced (e.g., ‘“Will he look in the (other locati 
he go to school?” vs. “Will he go to school or will he look in the (other 
location)?“). Similarly, for emotion judgments mention of happy or sad was 
counterbalanced (e.g., “Does he feel happy or does he feel sad?” vs. “Does 
he feel sad or does he feel happy?“). Half the children received Emotion 
tasks in their first session, and half received Action tasks first. 
Results 
A preliminary 2 (Sex) X 2 (Order of Sessions) x 3 (Story type) analysis of 
variance indicated that there were no effects of sex or of order of sessions 
(Emotion vs. Action story session first). Similarly, the two orders of stories 
within a session yielded nonsignificant differences. 
Figure 3 provides a graphical depiction of the results. On the left are 
predicted patterns of results if children understand the role of desires in 
predicting actions (at the top) and emotional reactions (at the bottom). At 
the right are the relevant data from the 16 2-year-olds. As can be seen, in 
essence children conform to the ideal pattern, Inferential statistics confirm 
this graphical picture. 
Univariate ANOVAs yielded significant effects of the story types-Finds- 
Wanted, Finds-Nothing, Finds-Substitute-for action judgments, F(2, 30) = 
39.12, p c 301, and for emotion judgments, F(2, 30) = 65.50, p c .OOOl. 
Scores for these analyses were children’s predictions of continued searching 
(proportion out of 2) for action stories, and predictions of happiness (propor- 
tion of 2) for emotion stories. As can be seen in Figure 3, children approp- 
riately predict continued searching for Finds-Nothing and Finds-Substitute 
story characters but cessation of search for Finds-Wanted. They appropriately 
predict happiness for Finds-Wanted but sadness for Finds-Nothing and Finds- 
Substitute stories. Post-hoc Scheffe comparisons (p c .OS) showed that Finds- 
Wanted scores for emotion judgments were appropriately higher, and for 
action judgments appropriately lower, than in the other two conditions. The 
other two conditions did not differ from each other on either measure. 
Not only did 2-year-olds on average evidence these understandings of de- 
sire but most individual children did so. Children judged six stories with 
respect to action and six with respect to emotion. Being correct on five or six 
of the six judgments represents above-chance performance (binomial test, p 
c .OS one-tailed). Thirteen of 16 children (81%) were correct on five or six 
of the six action judgments and 13 of 16 children were similarly correct on 
78 
72 
when the dog is found, but Johnny should quit when he finds the dog. Ten 
of 16 children were correct on both of their pairs of this precise contrast for 
action judgments and two were correct once. Thus, these 2-year-ok were 
correct on 22 of 32 such contrasts (69%). Ten of 16 children were correct on 
both of their pairs of this precise contrast for emotion judgments and three 
were correct once. Thus, syear-olds were correct on 23 of 32 such contrasts 
(72%). 
Discussion 
These data straightforwardly depict older 2-year-olds’ ability to reason about 
actions and reactions via desire. Specifically, 2-year-olds correctly predicted 
actions from information as to a character’s simple desire, including the ap- 
propriate continuance and cessation of search, and correctly predicted emo- 
tional reactions, even to the extent of predicting that two characters finding 
the same attractive object woul be happy or sad depending on their relevant 
desires. In this regard note that children’s responses evidence not only the 
generation of correct inferences but also an appreciation that desires are 
internal psychological states. Young children might have thought that actions 
are caused by the external qualities of objects, for example that certain items 
are just objectively attractive, functioning somewhat like magnets, attracting 
any person in their path. But if so then both Sam (said to want a rabbit) and 
Johnny (said to want a dog) should be attracted to the same object. Children 
appropriately judged, however, that Sam and Johnny would be happy only 
with different objects and would stop searching under different conditions. 
This same finding serves to demonstrate that 2-vear-olds understood charac- 
ters’ motives as something like desires rather than as drives. Children judged 
that characters’ actions and reactions were object specific, as appropriate for 
desire. When Johnny wants a dog, he is happy and ceases searching only 
when he finds a dsg. In short, 2-year-olds reasoned correctly about the 
characters’ internal object-specific states, their simple desires. 
Children’s desire reasoning encompassed two separable aspects: ratings of 
characters’ emotions and prediction of characters’ actions. Our demonstration 
that young children understand desire-dependent emotions adds to other re- 
we examined young children’s reasoning on 
4-4 fin k0l;rrC Fnm0fi&*e +rrntg A- we2 TXJ4 nm=n u VS. u-&fit*& I~uJu~~fig cctmn~ ua 
desire psycholo~sts, ;cZ drKE 
gists. Certainly the ease with 
solved de+- ; d M a icI Ju gment tasks in ErGeriment 1 suggests 
utilize desire reasoning. At the same time both we and 
b 1987) fail to find under- 
i in order to demonstrate 
same young children both succeed at simple desire reasoning tasks and also 
fail at comparable belief reasoning tasks. 
Our intent was to show that 2-year-olds not only understand simple desires 
but also faii to validly understand beliefs, To do this, we began with the 
simplest yet still valid belief reasoning tasks we could find. As noted above, 
many extant belief tasks (such as the false belief prediction tasks used by 
dually wellI controlled, (b) rep of the more com- 
desire reasoning tasks of a similar sort, that is, ks comparable to the belief 
ones but that mentioned only simple desires a hat could be solved via 
desire reasoning as we have been describing it. reasoned that if 2-year- 
olds passed the desire tasks but failed the belief tasks we would have a 
convincing initial demonstration of our proposed developmental sequence. 
The desire reasoning tasks we devised in this fashion provide replications 
and extensions VI .a._ tiW’c n4*be aption prediction tasks used in Experiment 1. For exam- 
to grant that even 2-year-olds have desires, that they are moti- 
sitions on the order of desires, preferences, and so on 
in the world. Furthermore, we assume that young 
children can purposefully engage in actions to fuEll their desires and also 
that they have errg+onal reactions dependent on the satisfaction or failure 
of their own desires. All this could be true and young children could still fail 
to conceive of their own and other’s behaviors in terms of a construct of 
~~Q~w nr cnmethit+ like it- Therefore, suppose in Experiment I that children _--___ __ L,-‘____. ---2 __- 
ve the scme desire as that stated for the protagonist-when John is 
as wanting a dog, the child himself wants a dog. When then asked 
whether John will search beyond location 1 the child simply reports his own 
action tendency-he would search if the item was still missing and he would 
stop searching when it was found. When asked to rate John’s emotion the 
child simply repor% his own -he is happy when the dog is found and unhappy 
if it is not. In Ex;5eriment 2 we utilized a Not-Own Desire task, where the 
child’s preference and that of the story character differed. If young c’hildren 
can properly predict the character’s action on the basis of the character’s 
desire and not their own, this substantially strengthens our demonstration 
that they conceive of desires ;;a& e~~play them in their reasoning over and 
above simply having them. 
Similarly, according to our analysis of desire reasoning if a desire 
psychologist knows that Sam wants an apple and that the apple is in one of 
two locations, he can predict Sam will search that location. The converse of 
this is that if there are apples in both locations the character should be indif- 
ferc~t between them. Thus, we utilized a No-Preference Desire task to test 
whether 2-year-olds understand this aspect of si desire reasoning. If 
these action prediction tasks are also solved by ar-olds we will have 
control for this pos- 
they themselves think the dog is, 
ldren predict Sam’s be- 
tasks are therc- 
wn Desire tasks parallel to Not-O 
evidence some understanding of desire as a cause of action. Successful perfor- 
desire task (Wellman & Bartsch, 1988) designed to control, in part, for reality 
assessment reasoning. In Discrepant Belief tasks, there are target objects in 
both of two locations (e.g., magic markers in the desk and in the toy 
and the child knows this. Then the child is told for example, that “Bill 
there are only magic markers in the desk, he doesn’t think there are magrc 
markers in the toy box”. Correct prediction of Bill’s behavior while simul- 
taneously knowing that markers are really in both places requires predi~~on 
ill’s behavior via an understanding of belief rather than a reality assess- 
ment strategy. 
No-Preference Desire tasks were designed to parallel Discrepant Belief 
tasks. In ~0.preference Desire tasks, as in D~screp~t Belief tasks, children 
see that target objects are really in both locations (e.g., ma 
sk and in the toy box). Then they are told Jill’s desire (to fi 
this situation (lacking any di~erentiat~g belief on Jill’s part), reasoning 
simply that the actor will act to fulfill her desires should lead “cj a prediction 
of no preference on Jill? part for either location, and hence children should 
predict that Jill will look in either or both locations. Successful performance 
on No-Preference Desire tasks therefore would demonstrate that children 
understand an aspect of desire reasoning not tested in Experiment 1; namely, 
that given a desire and equal alternatives, an actor would be indifferent 
between them. Correct performance on the No-Reference Desire tasks but 
not Discrepant Belief tasks would imply the presence of desire reaso~g 
before belief reasoning. 
Subjects 
Twenty young ~~ldren from the same preschool program described in 
Experiment 1 participated (~ = 3-0, range 2-9 to 3-3, 10 boys and PO girls). 
We used this age range in order to test some children who shou23 evidence 
desire reasoning while failing to understand belief, as well as some children 
who should unde~tand beliefs as well as desires. 
rence Desire tasks, children were 
ook for bananas. 
)” and then asked to make their prediction. As the doors 
to the two locations remained closed after the initial viewing, children were 
not able to see the object whe!,: they made their judgments. After they made 
judgments children were asked, as a control question, whether there 
also some of the desired objects in the other location, to ensure that 
remembered that target objects were really in both locations. No chil- 
ded incorrectly to thes rol questions. 
elief and Not-Own re tasks children were first intro- 
oard character. The were shown a depiction of two 
locations, for example, a classroom and a playground. 0th locations were 
presented as be ng plausible choices for fulfillment of th haracter‘s desires. 
For example, in Not-Own Desire tasks children were told “At Betsy’s school 
they can play th puzzles in the classroom or they can play with sand on the 
playground.” Not-Own Belief tasks, children were told that “Sam’s puppy 
might be in (one location) or it might be in the (other)“. In Not-Own Belief 
tasks children then were asked to choose which Pocation they thought the 
rly ~~e~o~~e~~ of everyday psychology 263 
e of task, certain procedural controls were instituted. Each 
ratter’s beliefs or desires was presented in both the 
today; she doesn’t want to play with sand” in the Not-Own Desire tasks, or 
ary ik&& her ball is by the garage, she doesn’t think it’s by the porch in 
the Not-Own Belief tasks. Order of presentation of positive and negative 
forms was counterbalanced. 
esults 
We first compared Not-Own Belief to Not-Own Desire performance, then 
iscrepant-Belief to No-Preference Desire performance. After re- 
porting these analyses we will place our findings with very young children in 
the context of comparable data for 3- and 4-year-olds. 
Not-Own Belief versus NotmOw? Desire 
In both of these tasks children were given sufficient information to predict 
one of the two story locations as the character’s choice. Scores, therefore, 
were the number of correct choices on the three stories of each type. A 
preliminary analysis showed no effects of sex or of order (getting belief vs. 
desire stories first). A univariate (Condition: belief vs. desire) ANOVA 
yielded a significant effect, F(1, 19) = 8.14, p < .01. These young 
averaged 73% correct responding on Not-Own Belief stories and 93% correct 
responding on Not-Own Desire stories, both of which exceeded a chance 
value of 50% (ps < .05). 
The most important question is whether 2-year-olds frequently understand 
desire but not belief. Being correct on three of three tasks represents a sub- 
stantial degree of understanding, unlikely by chance alone. Only 9 of 20 
children (45%) were correct on aii three Not-Own Belief stories whereas 17 
of 20 (85%) were correct on a.11 0 e Not-Own Desire stories. Nine children 
passed all three desire tasks but failed the parallel belief tasks whereas only 
one child showed the reverse pattern, McNemar’s x2 (1) = 4.91, p < .O5. 
Discrepant Belief versus No-Preference Desire 
These young children were poor at Discrepant Belief tasks, as expected. 
ou above, that performance should 
and Discrepant Belief tasks. Our 
n 2 above, children responded sitilarly to both tasks. 
with prediction 1 above, that on No-Preference Desire tasks 
ferent from a value of 50%) t(16) = - 30, n.s. Fifty percent represents equal 
~stibu~on of responses across the two locations and is what would be ex- 
pected if children were choosing either location based on an understanding 
of the character’s indifference between the two locations. It might be argued 
that such performance reflects only chance ~e~o~~n~e in a two-choice task 
rather than an understanding of indifference. However, several aspects of the 
data ~~~ that children were approp~ately jud~ng that the character 
would be indifferent. 
First, in the No- nce Desire ~nditio~ c xplicitly mentioned 
that the character search both toeatiom their responses, 
g ast a partial und the two locations 
th 11 the ch~ac~er~~ larly ~pre~ive as 
” was not explicitly presented as ~rnpa~~n~ no 
” responses were given to Not-Own d only 7% were 
given to the parallel ‘Discrepant Belief tasks. These data suggest that chil- 
dren’s responding indexes an ~pp~~~i~~on of the characters indifference in 
No-Preference situations, rather imple random respon 
~e~nd ren’s responses 6) 
sire tasks can be co d to their responses on Not- 
Pseudocorrect responding was 44% on No-Preference 
responding was 96% on Not-Own Desire tasks, F(1, 16) = 36.77, p c .OOl. 
The same children thus chose single correct locations on Not-Own Desire 
tasks and chose either location on No-Preference tasks. This d~erenti~ re- 
sponding across critically different desire tasks de~~onstrates an approp~ate 
understanding of desire. Children do not respond randomly to desire reason- 
ing tasks; instead they correctly predict a choice where one is appropriate 
(Not-Own Desire) and correctly predict indifference where it is appropriate 
(No-Preference). 
Children’s responding on the Discrepant Belief tasks also did not differ 
from SO%, t(l6) = .93, n,s. This is in accord with our second prediction 
above, that children interpret Discrepant Belief tasks only in simple desire 
terms (and thus predict indifference). However, in this case we have no 
further data to rule out the possibility that very young children are simplex 
pe~o~ing rando~y on Discrepant Belief tasks In either event (whether 
c~~dren predict indi~erence or respond rando~y) however, Young ~dren 
fail the Discrepant Belief task. Therefore, across No-Preference Desire, Not- 
Own Desire, and Discrepant Belief tasks children’s performance again reve- 
a’ls the hypothesized pattern of failing belief reasoning tasks while passing 
comparable desire tasks. 
These data on very young children’s poor performance on belief tasks is 
more revealing if seen in the light of the correct performance of only slightly 
older children. In several studies (here and in Wellman & Bartsch, 1988) we 
have now collected data from children ranging in age m 2 years 5 months 
to 5-O on both Not-Own Belief tasks and Discrepant Belief tasks. Table 2 
presents these aggregated data. As can be seen there, the youngest children 
(2-5 to 3-O) are at chance on belief reasoning. At only a slightly older age, 












































with tasks which 
e then examked whether 
us demonstration of an 
aese aggregated data depict a tendency for Not-Own Belief tasks to be easier than Discrepant Belief 
younger ages. This trend is evident in Experiment 2 as well; the 20 Experiment 2 children averaged 
rrect on Discrepant Belief tasks and 73% correct on Not-Own Belief tasks. However, this difference 
significant. 
Gabon about desires as well as beliefs, still, 
belief then he or she could ly answer correctly, because 
ry to know or assume that 
e think that young children firsi iai@ Lcrst2nci beliefs only as a supplement to 
to convey a character’s belief to the subjects (e.g., “‘Suzi thinks there are 
bananas in the “). ~~~~a~ty with or miscomprehension of the 
term may have young child~~n’s understanding of the concepts. How- 
ever, children of this age are clearly conversant with the term think, indeed 
children spontaneously produce #~~~~ and blew in their everyday utterances 
& Silber, 1983). The Shatz et al. (1983) data, fo 
point, our desire statements (e.g., “Sam wants to find his rabbit”) in both 
Experiments 1 and 2 employed parallel prediaate complement rnncta%ions. 
Two-year-olds clearly understood complex statements of this sort in our tasks. 
In u&i important sense, of course, 2-year-olds do not correctly understand 
mental terms like tkiprk. Namely, although children spontaneously use mental 
verbs such as think, know, and forget earlier in the third year of life, they 
only use such verbs for reference to mental states in the months just before 
the third birthday (Shatz et al., 1983). That is, only right before age 3 do 
children use the term think to talk about a person’s thoughts and beliefs, 
evidencing appropriate comprehension of such terms. But this is our point. 
If we are correct, children fail to understand a construct of belief until late 
in the third year and thus, while aware of the term and even using it, da fail 
to appropriately understand the term think. 
These findings shed light on early desire reasoning and on early belief-desire 
reasoning as well. With respect to desire reasoning, summing across both 
studies, 2-year-olds correctly predicted characters’ actions given information 
as to the characters’ desires, including (1) predicting cessation of search -when 
desires were fulfilled, (2) predicting continuance of search when desires were 
unfulfilled (even when the character found an attractive object but not the 
desired object), (3) predicting that the character would engage in a specific 
activity opposite to the child’s own desired activity, and (4) predicting that 
characters would be essentially indifferent to which of two locations they 
would search if both locations contained the desired objects. These yourig 
children also correctly predicted characters’ emotional reactions including (5) 
predicting happiness when outcomes fulfilled desires and (6) predicting un- 
happiness when outcomes failed td fulfill desires. Taken singly, correct per- 
e desires, that is, 
age children understand others’ mental 
reasoning about peopie’s actions when presented information as to their sim- 
ple desires, and hence with a simple sort of dispositionllil reasoning. This 
represents an impressive acquisition of a psychological understanding of 
human action in very young children. 
y attributing a simple desire psychology to very young chikhen we grant 
g awareness of how people’s internal intentional states can 
ior. In the introduction we contrasted this conception of 
drives and with beliefs. We believe that the understanding 
demonstrated by 2-year-&% is more than the former but less than the latter. 
d of Experiment 1 we discussed hovv our data docu ent that young 
children’s understanding of desire is object specific in a way that goes bevond 
a conception of mere drives. It is worth considering, however, whether 2- 
year-olds” conceptions might be something more on the order of tropisms 
Tropisms have an object directedness, as 
toward sun or mosquitoes ahat seek blood. 
on simple desires are psycho1 states, whereas tropisms, 
ordinarrly think of them, are ‘he flower does not ~~~~~~ 
to grow to the sun; a mosquito does not olvant blood. 
exhibiting only a trupistic psychology? We think not, D 
states are linked to other psychological states in spe 
nked to emotions. Tropisms, in contrast, 
flower is not happy when it orients toward the sun; the mosquito 
or angry if everyone at the picnic is wearing bug reagent. But 
such emotional reactions are implied by desires and even 2-year-olds know 
this. Thus, in Experiment 1 Johnny finds his desired dog he not only 
ceases to search, he is happy. en Betsy fails to find her horse she not only 
continues to search, she is Children’s unde~tanding of these sorts of 
ncomitant emotional reactions is consistent with their understandin 
sons as having simple desires beyond evidencing tropisms. 
Our data extend several other recent findings which suggest that 2-year- 
olds evidence a sizable developing understanding of human action as stem- 
ming from the internal goals and motives of the actor. For example, in their 
spontsneous speech children begin to talk about internal states such as wants 
aud happiness at about their second birthday (e.g., ~rethe~~n & 
W? j More impressive than just the appearance of such words in t 
lan&age is the nature of children’s conception of action that ~nde~ins their 
comprehension and production of such welds. Hood and Bloom (1979) 
analyzed the natura~y occurring causal utterances of eight children studied 
longitudinally from approximately 2 to 3 years. They found that children’s 
causal explana~ons were correctly ordered and commendably sensible. They 
found as well that children made almost wholly references to psychological 
causation. “Children did talk about intentions and motivations in their causal 
utterances which could be support for Piaget’s characterization of the child’s 
first causal relations as expressing . . . psycho cal causality” (pp. 29-30). 
ore recently, tonlocher and Smiley ttonlocher & Smiley, 1987; 
onlocher, Sm & Charney, 1983; Smiley & Huttonlocher, in press) 
have been intensively investigating young ~hildren’s understanding and use 
of action verbs. Su.ch verbs can refer to overt aspects of events (e.g., bounz- 
& ~~~Q~i~g) or to ~~y~h~~~ogical aspects of agency such as goals and desires 
(e.g., getting, pulling, w&ding). Huttonlocher and Smiley believe children 
first understand others’ ae~io~s only in terms of observable features, but their 
data show that children clearly construe otherA’ actiorrrs with respect to in 
nal states early in the third year of life. “As children approach P/2 years, t 
begin to describe other people as subject of experience, using words like get, 
our own. 
gin to demonstrate that desire reaso g precedes children’s 
ini hology. Besides the data rep d here, this proposed 
dewelopment~ seque e frown understanding desire to understanding belief 
ives suggestive support from several other sources. For exampie, in span- 
anguage use while very young 2-year-olds are already using such 
rds as want and related emotion words such as happy, they only 
egin to sensibly use mental terms such as think, ow, and surprise at just 
efore the third birthday (Bret 82; Shatz et al., 1983). 
Furthermore, young childre ave been found to use 
eontic modal expression. ije odal auxiliaries, such as 
t in English, can refer to notions o ity, intention, and per- 
ntic modalitgp - 01 to notions of pr ity, conviction and log- 
ical necessity -epistemic I modality. Deontic modality seem early aligned 
with notions of agency, desire, and intent-that is, notions t seem mean- 
ingful within simple desire psychology alone. Epistemic modality seems 
clearly aligned with notions of belief nd conviction-that is, aspects of belief 
encompassed by belief-desire psych oth ii1 English and in other lan- 
guages such as Greek, 2- and 3-yea onsistently evidence use of modal 
expressions for deontic meanings before they use the same expressions for 
istemic meanings (Stephany , 1986). 
Finally, in another study (Bartsch & Wellman, 1989) we have asked young 
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both belief and desire explanations. 
mg asked for example “What does Jane 
consistently provided desire explanations but never mentio 
did not use it with 2-year-olds in this study. However, this pattern of results 
with 3-year-olds corroborates the current results-early understanding of de- 
sire before understanding of belief. 
These findings of a developmental transition from simple desire to ordinary 
belief-desire psychology are consistent with the hypothesis that not only 
belief-desire psychology succeed an understanding of simple desires but 
it develops out of it. We believe, as outlined in the introduction, that belief- 
desire psychology represents a theory change sponsored by and derived from 
simple desire psychology. To reiterate, an understanding 06 simple desires 
provides the yo child with significant explanatory resources, allowing the 
child to predict understand a variety of actions emotional reactions 
as stemming from the actor’s internal desire states. owevzr, a revision of 
simple desire psychology is necessitated by the predictive and explanatory 
failures of that reasoning scheme, failures which engender a construct of 
belief. Thus, for example, two characters with equal desires can still engage 
in different actions and have different emotionai reactions to the same out- 
come because they have different beliefs. These sorts of everyday phenomena 
are theoretical anomalies for desire psychology. Note, however, that thinking 
about actors in intentional terms at all, that is, with respect to their internal 
desires, makes it possible for the child to confront such theoretical anomalies 
in the first place. A behaviorist, for example, would not face such problems. 
But, such anomalies once generated require addition of a k’ery different sort 
of intentional construct to one’s theoretical arsenal, specifically 2 conception 
of cognitive states of representation and conviction, not mereiy states of 
desire and disposition. 
This hypothesis addresses, in part, the intriguing question of where does 
everyday belief-desire psychology come from? The question “where does 
some conceptual understanding come frcm ?” has at least two developmental 
answers: one with rP,spect to origins and one with respect to mechanisms. TO 
e i~~~~atio~ we have provided and the hypothesis as 
e at least two components: a specification of 
on of the mechanisms in terms of which that 
change under consideration. Both components are necessary for stating the con- 
n induction that guarantee that learning is possible. Psychologists who 
lack of mechanisms of conceptual change focus on only half of the 
Equally important is the specification of the i&ial state (Carey, 1985, 
In this research we attempt to characterize, if not precisely the “initial 
e”“, a very early understanding of human action, simple desire psychology. 
cover, we have pinpointed an early transition to a first understanding of 
mind and of belief-desire psychology. We are not claiming that under- 
standing of desires ceases at this point of transition, it does not. Adult under- 
standing of desire goes far beyond an understanding of simple desires as we 
have described them. We are clanming instead that an initial understanding 
of simple desires precedes and also results in an understanding of ordinary 
beliefs and that acquisition of this later constmct seriously transforms the 
young child’s naive psychology. 
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